Introduction
In August 2004, on the last day the 9/11 Commission was statutorily permitted to exist, a 240-page staff report describing the 9/11 Commission border team's 15 months of work in the area of immigration, visas, and border control was published on the web. 1 9/11 and Terrorist Travel focused on answering the question of how the 9/11 hijackers managed to enter and stay in the United States.
2 To do so, we looked closely at the immigration records of the hijackers along with larger policy questions of how and why our border security agencies failed us. The goal of this report is to build on that report in two areas: (1) to provide additional facts about the immigration tactics of indicted and convicted operatives of al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah and other terrorist groups from the 1990s through the end of 2004; and (2) to enlarge the policy discussion regarding the relationship between national security and immigration control. This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the 9/11 Commission or its staff.
Background
The terrorist operatives covered in this report are foreign nationals. They all had to travel to the United States in order to conduct their operations here. Few had difficulty getting into the United States. Many successfully obtained immigration benefits while here. Most have committed immigration law violations in addition to terrorist offenses, some of which have resulted in deportation or imprisonment in U.S. jails.
What requires emphasis is the ease with which terrorists have moved through U.S. border security and obtained significant immigration benefits such as naturalization. The security gaps that existed then still, in many instances, exist today. My work on the 9/11 Commission made it clear that terrorists need travel documents for movement at some point during their journey here as much as they need weapons for operations. Once within U.S. borders, terrorists seek to stay. Doing so with the appearance of legality helps ensure long-term operational stability. At the 9/11 Commission we called this practice embedding, a term also used in this report.
Terrorists have used just about every means possible to enter the United States, from acquiring legitimate passports and visas for entry to stowing away illegally on an Algerian gas tanker. 3 This study reviews 94 individuals closely affiliated with terror organizations, whether through overt terrorist acts, connections to criminal activity in support of terror, or terror financing. Most have been convicted or indicted. It summarizes how these terrorists have successfully sought legal immigration benefits through fraudulent means and the legal action (if any) taken against them. This report only includes the six 9/11 hijackers who abused immigration benefits to stay in the United States.
terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad; and the affiliations of eight others indicted or detained on terrorism-related charges are unknown.
While I was able to rely on legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service immigration alien files and legal documents for over half of this study, the most recent entries draw on multiple news accounts when indictments are unavailable. The immigration alien files are derived from the 9/11 Commission staff report 9/11 and Terrorist Travel-where statutory authorities permitted us access to normally inaccessible immigration alien files-for 46 of these individuals. In another 24 cases, we were able to rely on legal documents (often with multiple defendants).
Valid visas were held upon entry by 35 . This number includes the six 9/11 hijackers known to have sought enhanced immigration status while in the United States. Student visas to attend various universities were used by 18 individuals and four had applications approved to change status from tourist to student. Another 17 used a visitor visa-either tourist (B2) or business (B1)-to enter. In at least 13 instances, the foreign nationals in this study overstayed their visas. In all 94 cases, the terrorist sought to stay in the United States once he or she had successfully entered.
All those who engage or intend to engage in terrorist activity upon entry into the United States have committed fraud under U.S. immigration law. However, traditional fraud used to attain some form of immigration benefit, e.g. false documentation, lying about material facts, or entering into a sham marriage, was frequent. About twothirds of the individuals studied (59) clearly engaged in fraud in order to enter or embed in the United States, and they did so multiple times (79 instances) . Discovery of such fraud usually occurred while the individuals were attempting to upgrade their status in some way (e.g., obtain work authorization, become legal permanent residents, or become naturalized). Representatives of every terrorist organization in this study used fraud to some degree, although certain groups appear to use characteristic patterns of tactics in their travel operations. The level of fraud within these cases ranges from a relatively "minor" failure to disclose information on immigration forms to the alteration or fabrication of passports and other travel documents. An individual was categorized as engaging in fraud so long as the circumstances of his or her immigration history revealed fraudulent activity in relation to any immigration matter, even if no criminal charges for fraud were ever brought.
There were 12 instances of passport fraud and 11 of visa fraud; 39 times, individuals were charged with making false statements to a border, immigration enforcement, or benefits adjudicator. Seven were indicted for acquiring or using other forms of fake identification, including driver's licenses, birth certificates, social security cards, and immigration arrival records.
Once in the United States, 16 of 23 applicants for legal permanent residency obtained it, and 20 of 21 attempts to become naturalized were successful. At least 18 of these applications were based on marriage to a U.S. citizen, with a minimum of 10 being a sham (one convicted terrorist married three times). 7 In 17 instances, the terrorists claimed to lack proper travel documents and instead sought political asylum.
The 1986 amnesty program was fraudulently used five times in attempts to establish residency. One terrorist, Mir Aimal Kansi, sought amnesty under the 1986 law for illegal entrants. 8 Four others, three convicted for their roles in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and one in the 1993 Landmarks case, sought amnesty under the Special Agricultural Workers Program. Three who sought amnesty under this program attained it. 9 The individuals reviewed in this chapter were from all over the Middle East. No country produced more than 10 percent of the individuals in the data sample. Eleven individuals traveled to the United States on documents from Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan. In addition, eight individuals came from Lebanon, while seven originated from the Palestinian territories and Iraq. Only five individuals entered from Saudi Arabia, and four from Morocco. Countries of origin with three or fewer persons were Kuwait, Yemen, the UAE, Syria, Qatar, Algeria, Somalia, Iran, the Sudan, South Africa, and France.
The

Naturalized Citizens
Of the 20 successful naturalizations out of 21 applications in this study, 11 had clear indications of fraud. Three of those instances related to document fraud. Another nine withheld material facts or lied on immigration documents.
Until the formation of the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003, legacy INS was responsible for adjudicating naturalization applications for eligibility. In 2004, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services at DHS processed about 600,000 applications. Because of the 1986 illegal-alien amnesty, and other reasons, naturalization applications surged in the 1990s, reaching 1.5 million in 1997. 10 Background checks prior to 9/11 consisted of minimal and sometimes nonexistent reviews of FBI paper files. Today, concern that terrorists may seek naturalization is understood yet will remain difficult to prevent under current law, where USCIS does not have direct access to federal law enforcement or intelligence information, cradle to grave identification numbers and travel histories do not exist, and where applications are neither wholly electronic nor biometric. In 2000, Faris traveled to Afghanistan with this same senior al Qaeda member. There he was introduced to Osama bin Ladin at an Afghan training camp. During meetings with senior members of al Qaeda, Faris was asked about procuring an "escape" plane. Faris then became involved with plots that included the Brooklyn Bridge and trains. 13 He also conspired with Nuradin Abdi to bomb a Columbus shopping mall (a plan discussed below). 14 Faris admitted to federal agents that during another trip to Karachi in early 2002, he was introduced to KSM. 15 As the two talked about Faris's work as a truck driver in the United States, Faris told KSM that some of his deliveries were made to air cargo planes. KSM was interested in Faris's access to these planes, and the two discussed how cargo planes held "more weight and more fuel," 16 and thus had excellent potential to be converted into weapons. 17 Faris's employer, Yowell Transportation, confirmed that Faris regularly delivered to an air cargo company at the Columbus airport. 18 It may have been Emery, a global cargo company that has its North American hub in Columbus.
According to Faris, KSM told Faris that al Qaeda was planning two simultaneous attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. The two then talked about destroying the Brooklyn Bridge by severing its suspension cables. Faris was tasked with obtaining the necessary equipment.
19
In April 2002, Faris returned to the United States and researched "gas cutters" and the Brooklyn Bridge on the Internet. He also traveled to New York City in late 2002 to examine the bridge. He decided the plan was too difficult because of the security and the structure of the bridge. Faris then sent a coded message communicating this to al Qaeda leadership. 20 The Special Case of the Sham Marriage Marrying a U.S. citizen is one of the easiest ways to stay in the United States once within the country's borders. Whether an individual comes to the United States and receives a two-week business entry, a six-month tourist length of stay, or a "duration of status" commensurate with his or her schooling, marrying an American provides an entrée toward a permanent legal status and eventual naturalization. Of the 20 naturalized citizens and 16 legal permanent residents in this study, at least 18 married U.S. citizens, 10 of whom entered into sham marriages to obtain residency, some of them multiple times.
Two conversations between radical Islamists about travel and immigration suggest the tactical importance of such marriages. In the first, taped in August 2000 in Italy between Es Sayed (the document forger active in Italy who was discussed above) and Abdulsalam Ali Ali Abdulrahman (a Yemeni described by foreign law enforcement as one "who travels on a diplomatic passport"), the subject of marrying Western women is woven into a discussion of jihad: 24 In November 1990, a year after Nosair was naturalized, the radical rabbi Meir Kahane was murdered in New York City. Nosair, seen holding the gun at the scene, attempted to flee but was caught; he was eventually acquitted of murder but convicted of weapons charges. He was later indicted for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, in part because he had in his apartment numerous sensitive U.S. military documents from Fort Bragg, now believed to have been provided by Ali Mohamed (discussed below). In March 1993, while searching the apartment of Ibrahim El-Gabrowny, who was the messenger in the World Trade Center plot, authorities discovered a series of fraudulent Nicaraguan passports for his cousin Nosair and Nosair's family. They also found five birth certificates-for Nosair, his wife, and their three children-and driver's licenses, all in the names of aliases.
Al Qaeda. Three defendants involved in the August 1998 East Africa bombings married U.S. citizens; two acquired legal permanent residency and one became naturalized. Their immigration status enabled all three to operate in the United States for at least a dozen years prior to their arrests for their terrorist activity. Initially they worked on behalf of other radical Islamists and then, after the organization was founded, for al Qaeda, doing substantial damage to U.S. national security in the process.
Ali Mohamed was a key liaison between the East Africa conspirators and al Qaeda's leadership. He met his American wife on the plane to the United States in 1985, and had been a legal permanent resident since 1986. Mohamed was not arrested for his terrorist activity until 1998; before then, he moved frequently in and out of the United States on behalf of al Qaeda. Mohamed's criminal activities during his time in the United States included conducting a human smuggling operation on the West Coast, supplying U.S. military information to al Qaeda leadership, and training Bin Ladin's bodyguards abroad.
Wadi El-Hage came to the United States as a student in the early 1980s; he acquired legal permanent residency after marrying an American in 1986. He was later naturalized. 25 El-Hage had crossed paths with Mohamed on a number of occasions before planning began for the East Africa bombings. 26 He was an operational commander for that plot until his arrest by U.S. law enforcement 11 months before the bombings occurred. 27 During his nearly two decades in the United States, he had become Bin Ladin's personal secretary; he also worked with the Al Kifah Refugee Center in New York and set up numerous charitable front organizations for al Qaeda in Africa. Throughout this time, his immigration status enabled him to easily travel in and out of the United States.
Khalid Abu Al-Dahab married three American women before he finally was able to acquire legal permanent residency; he eventually was naturalized. During his 12 years in the United States, he provided money and fraudulent travel documents to terrorists around the globe. These activities linked him to numerous attacks, including the 1998 East Africa bombings.
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Hizballah. Six individuals involved in the Hizballah cigarette smuggling case in North Carolina engaged in a pattern of sham marriages to U.S. citizens followed by petitions to acquire legal permanent residency. The conspirators' "legal" immigration status allowed them to operate in the United States for nearly a decade raising thousands of dollars in organized crime activity that was both sent back in dollars to Hizballah in Lebanon and used to purchase military equipment such as stun guns, night vision goggles, computers, and digital and video cameras. 29 Like the 9/11 conspirators, they relied on fraud to enter the United States; but unlike the hijackers, whose stay would end with the execution of their plot, they needed to acquire an immigration status that would enable them to stay (and operate their cigarette smuggling operation) indefinitely. Three of these associates of Hizballah entered in 1992; they used Lebanese passports with counterfeit nonimmigrant tourist visas purportedly issued in Venezuela, and once the conspirators were inside U.S. borders, they paid U.S. citizens to marry them. 30 From January 1999 through January 2000, Said Mohamad Harb, one of the key figures in Hizballah's North Carolina operation run by Mohamad Hammoud, helped secure three fraudulent visas and three sham marriages for the purpose of "legally" bringing to the United States his brother, his brother-in-law, and sister so that they might become legal permanent residents. The two men each obtained a nonimmigrant visa from the U.S. embassy in Cyprus; though given one-and two-week lengths of stays for conducting business upon entry into the United States, each married a U.S. citizen immediately after his arrival and therefore was allowed to stay indefinitely. In the case of Harb's sister, a male U.S. citizen was paid to meet her in Lebanon and then travel with her to Cyprus, where their marriage enabled her to acquire an immigration visa. In June 2000, Harb also attempted to give an immigration special agent a $10,000 bribe so that another brother could enter the United States.
Between 1995 and 2000, Hammoud held "prayer" meetings at his Charlotte home where he would show videos of Hizballah operations and solicit donations that amounted to thousands of dollars being sent to a Hizballah military commander in Lebanon. The first federal indictment was against 18 individuals involved in the cigarette smuggling scam that may have raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for Hizballah. A second indictment nine months later charged nine Lebanese with providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Seven of the conspirators pled guilty to lesser charges, while Harb entered into a plea agreement to testify against Hammoud. All the conspirators were convicted of all counts against them, including the immigration violations. 32 Hammoud was sentenced to 155 consecutive years. His sentence was reduced for exceeding the maximum sentencing guidelines and remanded to the lower court. 34 Sami Al Arian, the highly publicized lead defendant in the pending terrorism case in Tampa, came under intense scrutiny in 1995 as the suspected leader of the PIJ in the United States.
The 1995 raid of the Al Arian's offices uncovered a web of immigration violations. The most prominent of the violations is that Al Arian allegedly lied on his own naturalization petition, failing to list his affiliation with two PIJ front organizations. An immigration agent described the fraud scheme that Al Arian was possibly using in a November 1995 search warrant affidavit:
Based upon the facts and information that I have set forth in the instant affidavit, I have probable cause to believe that ICP (Committee of Palestine) and WISE (World and Islam Enterprise) were utilized by Sami Al Arian and Ramadan Abdullah Shallah as "fronts" in order to enable individuals to enter the United States, in an apparent lawful fashion, despite the fact that these individuals were international terrorists. Among the unlawful methods employed by these terrorist organizations are the apparent lawful procurement and use of visas and other documents relating to immigration that enable terrorists and other excludable aliens to gain entry into the United States through false statements, misrepresentations, and other forms of fraud.
35 Al Arian's immigration fraud extended to others within the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In September 1992, for example, Al Arian filed a petition for a temporary worker visa with the INS under false pretenses on behalf of Bashir Musa Nafi, one of the organization's original co-founders, who had worked for Palestinian Islamic Jihad at its London-based headquarters. The petition was granted, permitting Nafi to enter the country as a research director employed by WISE. In fact, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) employed Nafi. His lie about IIIT on his INS petition led to his being deported to London in June 1996, only four days after his apprehension by immigration authorities. 36 Six years later, in 2002, IIIT was investigated as part of a terror financing investigation of over 100 interconnected business enterprises, located mostly in northern Virginia.
The 1995 raid of Al Arian's offices also contributed to the eventual deportation of Mazen Al Najjar, Sami Al Arian's brother-in-law and a co-founder and the executive director of WISE. 37 Al Najjar was editor of WISE's journal, Qira 'at Siyasiyyah (Political Readings) 38 and attended numerous terror fundraising conferences. Al Najjar also committed a series of immigration violations, from a simple overstay of his student length of stay to his fraudulent marriage to an American woman for the purpose of obtaining permanent resident status. Prior to his deportation, Al Najjar was detained as a threat to U.S. national security. 39 Though Al Najjar repeatedly denied that his work at WISE was terrorist-related, audiotapes such as one from 1991 have Al Najjar calling for "the unification of efforts of the national and Islamic forces in the struggle, to face the new dangerous challenges to the Palestinian cause, the central cause of the Muslim Ummah."
40 Al Najjar's deportation was ordered on May 13, 1997, but he was not deported until 2002. 41 The September 2003 Al Arian superseding indictment included Al Najjar as a defendant, asserting that he was part of the PIJ's leadership in the United States. 42 The trial is on now.
Terrorist Affiliation and Denaturalization:The Case of Fawaz Damrah
The main method of pursuing denaturalization claims against terrorists and suspected terrorists is to show that their citizenship was illegally procured. To do so, the government must first criminally charge the citizen with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425-knowingly obtaining citizenship unlawfully. If a conviction can be secured on this charge, then denaturalization will automatically follow, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).
A recent example of this method is the case of Fawaz Damrah, the imam at the Islamic Center of Cleveland who acted as a chief fundraiser for PIJ. 43 Damrah was charged with making false statements when he submitted his "Application for Naturalization," INS form N-400. 44 Specifically, the government alleged that he had concealed from the INS his membership in or affiliation with three entities: Al Kifah Refugee Center, the Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Al Kifah was al Qaeda's recruitment center in the United States and ICP was the funding mechanism for PIJ. In addition, Damrah was accused of concealing from the INS that prior to applying for citizenship, he had "incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution" 45 of Jews and others, advocating or supporting violent terrorist attacks and engaging in religion-based persecution. 46 During the trial, jurors were shown footage of a 1991 speech in which Damrah called Jews "the sons of monkeys and pigs" 47 and a 1989 speech in which he declared "terrorism and terrorism alone is the path to liberation." 48 On June 17, 2004, a jury found Damrah guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1425. 49 He was sentenced to two months in prison 50 and stripped of his citizenship. 51 Following the verdict, Assistant U.S. Attorney Cheri Krigsman commented that Damrah "was the guy . . . brought in to raise the money for Islamic Jihad. Without the money they could not operate." 52 Funds raised in the Islamic Center of Cleveland were sent to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), 53 a charity named in July 2004 in a 42-count indictment for providing material support to Hamas, engaging in prohibited financial transactions with a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, money laundering, conspiracy, and filing false tax returns. 54 The grand jury had indicted Damrah on charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1425 on December 16, 2003-one day shy of the expiration of the 10-year statute of limitations for such prosecution (set it 18 U.S.C. § 3291). It was on December 17, 1993, that Damrah met with an INS examiner to complete his interview on the information contained within form N-400. At the interview, Damrah affirmed the truth of the answers given within the application, which he had originally filed on October 18, 1993. 55 Damrah subsequently challenged the jury verdict on several grounds, and asked the trial judge to grant an acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. The judge rejected Damrah's challenge. 56 In addressing Damrah's contention that the evidence presented by the government was not sufficient to fulfill its burden of proof, the judge reviewed the evidence presented by the government and repeatedly came to the same conclusions: "a rational jury could conclude [that Damrah made false statements on his INS application] beyond a reasonable doubt." 57 This evidence consisted of wiretapped conversations between Sami Al-Arian and Damrah, as well as videotapes of Damrah speaking. 58 The judge's conclusion provides insight into the burden of evidence that the government must meet in an 18 U.S.C. § 1425 prosecution: 231, 258 (1961) . 59 This is a lesser burden than the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard in Fedorenko 60 that applies to denaturalization proceedings. Damrah's conviction sets a precedent: The prosecution needs only to show that "a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt" that the naturalization was illegally procured, the same standard that governs general criminal offenses (including 18 U.S.C. § 1425).
Terrorists Who Abused Naturalization
• Nidal Abderrahman Ayyad. POB: Kuwait, COC: Jordan. WTC1. Father applies for LPR status on Ayyad's behalf and becomes naturalized in 1991. Withheld facts on naturalization application. Convicted for 240 years.
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• El Sayyid Nosair. POB: Egypt. Landmarks 1993, and holding gun at Rabbi Kahane's murder. Egyptian naturalized upon marriage to a US citizen. Acquitted of murder charge of Rabbi Kahane. Serving life case. Denaturalization recommended but not acted on. 62 • Khalid Abu Al Dahab. Al Qaeda; East Africa bombings 8/98. Naturalization after marriage to 3d U.S. citizen. 63 Also ran alien smuggling and document forgery ring in support of Al Qaeda.
• • Tariq Isa. POB: Palestinian areas. Laundered money from HLF to Hamas. Naturalized and indicted for terror financing.
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• Nageeb Abdul Jabar Al Hadi. COC: Yemen. Al Qaeda linked and activity possibly associated with other 9/11 related planes. Prior to the summer of 2001, and sought naturalization. On 9/2/01 received a U.S. visa and charged with lying on the application.
• Muhammad Salah. POB: Jerusalem. Hamas financier. Naturalized in 1990s, charged with RICO in 2004, not immigration violations. 75 • Soliman Biheiri. Major Hamas financier in N Va w/ the SAAR Network. Indicted for fraudulently obtaining naturalization in 2000; pled to passport fraud. 76 • Abdulrahman Alamoudi. POB: West Bank. Hamas financier. Indicted for fraudulent immigration docs and misuse of U.S. passport (naturalized 1996).
• Iyman Faris. 
Legal Permanent Residency
Legal permanent residency is an immigration benefit otherwise known as a "green card"; it is a necessary step for those living here who seek to become naturalized. Travel with a green card is permissible and relatively easy, but immigration laws still apply upon entry and holders of LPR status are not entitled to a U.S. passport. Applications for LPR status surged in the 1990s as a result of the 1986 illegal-alien amnesty and the increased legal immigration levels in the 1990 Immigration Act. In 1994, pending LPR applications were around 125,000.
The number surged to about 800,000 by 1998 and 1.2 million by 2003.
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Terrorists easily take advantage of the overwhelming numbers of applications and the ease with which the system can be manipulated due to its perpetual state of inadequate information technologies. The result is that fraud runs rampant in applications for immigration benefits, with estimates stated to me while I was on the 9/11 Commission by a senior official at USCIS to be anywhere from 50 to 75 percent. One scheme of many involves one applicant filing multiple applications under different identities with the goal of one of the applications being approved somewhere. Other forms of fraud include lying on the application, including about past criminal or terrorist activity. In this study, 16 of 23 terrorists who sought LPR status acquired it. LPR status was denied in most cases in this study when the underlying fraud was coupled with terrorist activity already under federal law enforcement investigation.
The FBI's Most Wanted Al Qaeda LPR
Born in Saudi Arabia, 82 Adnan El-Shukrijumah, aka "Jafar the Pilot," has spent 15 years in the United States (mostly in South Florida), speaks fluent English, and has been employed as a teacher.
83 El-Shukrijumah trained with Jose Padilla to partner in the dirty bomb plot, 84 helicopter plots, and the New York and New Jersey financial infrastructure plots discovered in the summer of 2004. A Department of Homeland Security document quoted in Newsweek states that "KSM has identified Adnan el Shukrijumah, a Saudi born permanent U.S. resident alien, as an operative with standing permission to attack targets in the United States that had been previously approved by Osama Bin Ladin." 85 FBI Director Robert Mueller called him "a trained operative who poses an operational threat to the United States" 86 who the FBI considers to be armed and dangerous. 87 In late 2000 or early 2001, El-Shukrijumah was under investigation for his relationship to Imran Mandhai, convicted in Florida of conspiring to bomb a National Guard armory, power stations, Jewish businesses, and Mount Rushmore prior to 9/11. 88 Mandhai was associated with Hakki Cemal Aksoy, convicted in 2002 for firearms violations and asylum fraud and in whose apartment bomb making manuals and notes were found. ElShukrijumah had previously applied for naturalization, but the INS interior enforcement office in Miami noticed that the application was fraudulent. The INS agents working the case met with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Miami, and even discussed seeking a search warrant for El-Shukrijumah's residence. Without further information linking El-Shukrijumah to terrorist activity, the matter was dropped. 89 As an LPR, El-Shukrijumah easily traveled to and from attended training camps in Afghanistan, 90 where he was most likely schooled by Ramzi Binalshibh, famous for his role as emissary between KSM and 9/11 ring leader Mohamad Atta. 91 El-Shukrijumah is a skilled bomb maker and a Florida-trained pilot, 92 and authorities have found a document that ties him (via one of his aliases) to the Oklahoma flight school where Zacarias Moussaoui trained. 93 He may have been friendly with Atta as well, as I describe an immigration officer's witnessing of receiving a request for help with travel documents in May 2001 from El-Shukrijumah on behalf of Atta and likely another 9/11 pilot in 9/11 and Terrorist Travel. 96 El-Shukrijumah surveilled the Panama Canal. 97 Back in the United States, he was also involved in an aborted plot with Jose Padilla to blow up apartment buildings in the United States.
According to
98 He was also likely Padilla's first partner in the dirty bomb plot, but differences between them ended the joint venture.
There are also reports that El-Shukrijumah attempted to procure radioactive material from McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. 99 In March 2004, El-Shukrijumah attended a terrorist summit in Pakistan and met with a number of key al Qaeda members, including Abu Issa Al-Hindi, Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, and Mohammed Babar. 100 Recently he has been spotted in Mexico. 101 He reportedly met with members of the Mara Salvatrucha gang (known as MS-13) in Honduras, although Interpol denies the existence of evidence of such a meeting. 102 In September 2004, the Aviation and Security Association reported, "An alert airline crewmember saw and then confronted a suspicious acting person at Kansai International Airport in Japan. El Shukrijumah was this suspicious person." However, law enforcement was not notified. 103 Reporting indicates that since El-Shukrijumah fled the United States after 9/11, he has tried to get back into the United States using various passports. 104 He has a Guyanese passport, but may also hold passports from Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Trinidad. 105 However, unless authorities made a decision to permit Shukrijumah his freedom for law enforcement or intelligence reasons, or know that he did manage to enter the United States on one of these passports undetected and law enforcement knows about it, I do not place much credence in these reports.
LPRs Move People and Goods
Uzair Paracha is a Pakistani citizen with lawful permanent resident status in the United States 106 who, along with his father, has ties to KSM. 107 Paracha's father has also been detained by U.S. authorities and is being held in Afghanistan. 112 The plot was intricate. KSM had also tasked Khan, whose relatives own gas stations in the city, to "move forward" with a plot to bomb a number of U.S. gas stations by "simultaneously detonating explosives in the stations' underground storage tanks," according to Justice Department documents summarizing KSM's interrogation that were quoted in Newsweek. 113 KSM reportedly wanted to use two or three African American Muslim converts to participate in the plot. Upon his capture, 114 Khan told the FBI that he saw two African Americans when he met with KSM in Pakistan in 2000. • Amir Abdelghani. Landmarks 1993. Naturalized or LPR status upon marriage to a U.S. citizen. Serving until 2019. 
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• Mohamed Kamal Elzahabi. Al Qaeda member. Obtained LPR status on sham marriage and material support terrorism offenses. 133 • Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook. U.S. Hamas leader. Received green card via lottery; INS detained him for terrorist activities, deported 4/97. Charged with RICO in absentia. 134 • Hasan Saddiq Faseh Alddin. Roommate of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar. LPR via marriage; convicted twice of domestic abuse, deported to Saudi Arabia.
• Anwar Nasser Aulaqi. 9/11 hijacker spiritual adviser. J1 visa to LPR, now fugitive.
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• Uzair Paracha. Al Qaeda, plan to blow up gas stations in Baltimore. LPR, indicted for terrorist conspiracy in 2003.
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• Adnan El-Shukrijumah. Al Qaeda, Padilla dirty bomb plan and others. LPR, now a fugitive.
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• Mekki Hamed Mekki. Al Qaeda, possible plot to fly a plane into a U.S. target. Submitted multiple diversity visa applications to obtain LPR status. Indicted. 140 At that time, the concern was that numerous foreign nationals from state sponsors of terrorism (notably Iraq) were obtaining educations in sensitive science-related fields such as nuclear energy. In the 1980s, Libyans who acquired student visas were believed to pose a national security threat. After 9/11, the spotlight turned to vocational pilot schools such as those attended by the four 9/11 hijacker pilots. While all these concerns are legitimate, it is critical that security vetting of students be efficient, electronic, and biometrically based to assure that foreign national terrorists like the ones discussed below can not use the student visa as an entry for their activities.
From Student Visa to Sham Marriage
Mohammad Kamal Elzahabi is a Lebanese national who entered the United States in 1984 on a student visa. He paid a woman in Houston, Texas, to marry him and help him obtain legal permanent resident status. Elzahabi divorced her in 1988, after he obtained his green card. 141 In July 2004, Elzahabi pled not guilty to charges that he had lied to FBI investigators during a terrorism-related investigation. 142 Upon obtaining his green card, Elzahabi left the United States to fight jihad in Afghanistan and met the key jihadi figures Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Raed Hijazi, and Bassam Kanj. He again traveled to Afghanistan in 1991 and remained there about four years. During this time, he was a sniper in combat and served as an instructor in small arms and sniper skills for other jihadists attending the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan. Elzahabi admitted that while he was in Afghanistan, he personally knew Abu Zubaida and knew of KSM. 143 Elzahabi returned to the United States in 1995 and moved to New York City, where he ran an axle-repair business. He used this business to help ship to Pakistan portable field radios, later found in Afghanistan by U.S. troops.
From 1997 to 1998 Elzahabi lived in Boston, working as a cabdriver. There he associated with Raed Hijazi, whom he aided in obtaining a Massachusetts driver's license in 1997. 144 Raed Hijazi (born in California to Palestinian parents and later radicalized) 145 was later convicted in Jordan for masterminding the failed Millennium bombing plot that had targeted American and Israeli tourists in that country. 146 While in Boston, he lived with Bassam Kanj, who had married an American in 1988 and was later naturalized. 147 Kanj helped Hijazi lease a taxi that officials believe was used to fund the Jordan plan. 148 Also working with these taxi drivers was Nabil Al-Marabh, discussed in the illegal entry section below.
Elzahabi also traveled to Lebanon, where he provided small arms training to the group of fighters that Bassam Kanj had formed to overthrow the government of Lebanon. Kanj was killed in 2000 in Lebanon. Elzahabi stated that he personally knew both KSM and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 149 Before the 9/11 attacks, the FBI identified Mohammad Kamal Elzahabi as a suspected terrorist. Yet in early 2002, Elzahabi received a commercial driver's license to operate a school bus and transport hazardous materials. 150 According to the Minnesota Department of Public Safety's Division of Driver Vehicle and Licensing, the FBI "ran his name through a database and cleared him." In June 2004, Elzahabi's license for transporting toxic materials was still valid, though his school bus driver's license had been canceled in February for reasons unknown. case potential economic and 'Jewish' targets in New York. 153 The plot was to include hijacked tourist helicopters, 154 limousines packed with explosives, or large trucks.
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Aafia Siddiqui is an alleged Al Qaeda operative and Pakistani citizen who entered the United States on a student visa and lived her for over a decade. 156 She studied and worked at Brandeis and MIT, training in biology and neurology. 157 With her primary residence in the United States, reports have placed Siddiqui in Liberia prior to 9/11, where she was tasked with acting as a mediator between other al Qaeda operatives. 158 According to the FBI's intelligence from KSM, Siddiqui was a travel facilitator in the United States, helping operatives successfully enter and embed here. 159 Her estranged husband supported al Qaeda by buying U.S. military style goods and manuals that were to be shipped to Pakistan. 160 In one instance, Siddiqui spent time in Maryland 161 helping facilitate the illegal entry of Uzair Paracha, to support the Baltimore gas station plot described above. Siddiqui was to similarly aid "other AQ operatives as they entered the United States." 162 Siddiqui is believed to have left Boston in January of 2003. 163 In March 2003, the FBI issued a global alert for Siddiqui. A report of her capture in Pakistan in April 2003 proved to be false, and a month later the FBI issued a BOLO ("be on the lookout for") on Siddiqui in connection with current threats against the United States. 164 KSM has identified Ali Al-Marri as "the point of contact for AQ operatives arriving in the United States for September 11 follow-on operations." 165 Al-Marri had reentered the United States on September 10, 2001, 166 in order to enroll in a graduate program at Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois. 167 Former Attorney General Ashcroft confirmed that Al-Marri was an operative "sent by al Qaeda to facilitate another wave of terrorist attacks on Americans." 168 KSM called Al-Marri "the perfect sleeper agent because he has studied in the United States, had no criminal record, and had a family with whom he could travel." 169 Phone records have tied AlMarri to a phone number linked to the 9/11 paymaster, Mustafa Al-Hawsawi; the 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta; and the alleged 20th hijacker, Zacharias Moussaoui. 170 Al-Marri was arrested as a material witness on a warrant issued out of the Southern District of New York in December 2001, 171 and in May 2003 he was indicted on a number of charges. These include making false statements to FBI agents during the investigation of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 ; making false statements to banks in Macomb, Ill.; identity fraud; and access device (credit card number) fraud. 172 In addition to lying about calling the telephone number linked to Al-Hawsawi, he told FBI agents that his last visit to the United States before 2001 was in 1991, even though he had entered the country in the summer of 2000. 173 In addition, a search of Al-Marri's apartment turned up jihadi material and an almanac bookmarked to locate information on dams, reservoirs, and railroads. 174 In June 2003, Al-Marri was declared an enemy combatant after the U.S. government received, in the words of the Department of Defense, "recent credible information provided by other detainees in the War on Terrorism." 175 One of those detainees alleged that Al-Marri was trained in poisons; others said that Al-Marri had met with Bin Ladin at the al Faruq training camp in Afghanistan and that Al-Marri offered to martyr himself.
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Mohammed Warsame was born in Somalia and sought refugee status in Canada in 1989. He became a naturalized Canadian citizen and moved to Minneapolis in 2002. 177 He was arrested in December 2003 as a material witness in the Zacarias Moussaoui case. 178 At the time of his arrest, he was a student at Minneapolis Community and Technical College. In January 2004, Warsame was indicted and charged with conspiracy to provide material support to al Qaeda. 179 Warsame has admitted attending an al Qaeda training camp in 2000 and 2001 and receiving military training (weapons, martial arts). He attended lectures given by Bin Ladin and even sat next to him at a meal. Moreover, he fought with the Taliban and provided financial assistance to al Qaeda members in Pakistan once he had returned to the United States. 
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• Sameeh Taha and Nadia Hammoudeh. Taught at PIJ-associated academy and employees of Sami al-Arian. Entry on student visas in 1993 and subsequent false LPR petitions. Convicted for financial fraud 8/04. 185 • Hani Hanjour. 9/11 pilot of the Pentagon flight. Entered on F1 visa for English language school in 9/00. Had attended such schools twice before in the US, but was a no show. 186 • Ziad Jarrah. 9/11 pilot of Pennsylvania flight. Attended U.S. flight school full time from initial entry, but never applied for a change of status, and thus excludable upon each of six subsequent re-entries.
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• Mohamed Atta. 9/11 pilot of WTC flight (AA 11) and operational commander. 9/19/00 applies for a change of status from visitor to student until 9/8/01; application approved 7/17/00.
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• Marwan Al-Shehhi. 9/11 pilot of WTC flight (UA 175). 9/22/00 applies for change of status from visitor to student until 9/8/01; application approved 8/9/01. 189 • Ayman Ismail. HLF (Hamas) fundraiser, website designer.Violated student status when became on HLF employee without seeking a change of status. Deported to Jordan.
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• Adham Amin Hassoun. Hamas fundraiser, including Holy Land Foundation and the Global Relief Foundation. Entered as student and charged w/ terror financing and conspiracy to murder citizens in a foreign country.
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• Abdel Jabbar Hamdan. HLF fundraiser. Entered on student visa in 1979 and detained on immigration violations. 192 • Osama Satti. Lashkar-e-Taiba. (Pakistani terror group) weapons acquisition. Came originally as student in 1990 and got 2 degrees from Rochester Institute of Technology. On 9/6/01 entered as B2 and overstayed and convicted also of firearm possession. 193 • Sami Omar Al-Hussayen. Jihadi website master. Entered on F1 visa in 1999 until detained 2002. Not convicted of multiple counts of visa fraud and material support to terrorists after classified evidence supporting allegations remained protected. 194 • Issa Al-Britani (aka Dhiren Barot). IMF, NYSE, Prudential surveillance Student visa used several as cover for mission while attending various US universities. 195 • Aafia Siddiqui. Al Qaeda. Entered on F1 in mid 1990s and fugitive since 2003. 196 • Ali Al-Marri. Al Qaeda. Entered on 9/10/01 for purpose of a participating in more U.S. attacks.
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The
Religious Worker Visa
Among the specific requirements of obtaining a religious worker visa is the filing of an application from a primary religious organization -such as a mosque -to certify that the applicant: a) is a minister, or professional or other religious worker; b) is in the United States solely to engage in a religious vocation or to work for a bona fide United States religious organization; c) has been a member in the sponsoring religious organization's denomination continually for two years; and d) has received a job offer as a religious worker and will not be working in any secular employment. 198 From 1999 to 2004, about 106,000 people were admitted to the United States using visas for "religious workers." Since 9/11, the number of these admissions has continued to increase. Between 1992 and 1998, there were about 42,000 such admissions. The largest number were foreign nationals from Mexico (5, 198) , India (4,666), Canada (4,357), and Britain (3,393). Immigration authorities do not maintain statistics for admissions by religion. However, in the past three years, records indicate that more than 1,000 holders of religious worker visas from predominantly Muslim countries were granted admission; topping the list for these countries were Egypt (270), Indonesia (173) , and Pakistan (113).
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A source inside U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services told me while I was working on the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that religious worker visa fraud was known to be extremely problematic, in part because there is little vetting of either the religious institutions that sponsor the visa applicants, nor rules in place that can verify the authenticity of the applicant. Even in 2000, fraud in the religious worker authorizations was a known problem. In that year, in a hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims in 2000, Chairman Lamar Smith remarked in his opening statement: 
In 1997, the State Department's Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs wrote to me that the Department has: ''uncovered a troubling number of scams, both individual and organized, seeking to exploit this category to obtain immigration benefits illegally . . .. Most problematic are those cases that involve organized fraud rings in which documents of religious institutions in the U.S. are fabricated, or when the applicant colludes with a member of a religious institution in the U.S. to misrepresent either his or her qualifications, or the position to which the applicant is destined. The American Embassy in Moscow discovered a fraud ring in New York which fabricated documentation of several religious denominations in New York City on behalf of applicants who had no religious training and no intention of taking up religious occupations in the U.S. Several consular offices have reported suspicions that
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More specifically, the GAO said in a 1999 report on religious worker visa fraud that:
They (the INS) do not have data or analysis to firmly establish the extent of fraud in the religious worker visa program. The nature of the fraud uncovered typically involved (1) applicants making false statements about their qualifications as religious workers or their exact plans in the United States or (2) conspiracy
between an applicant and a sponsoring organization to misrepresent material facts about the applicant's qualifications or the nature of the position to be filled. 201 The problem of religious worker fraud is a mere subset of the fraud that has traditionally run rampant throughout the immigration benefits system. In the student visa arena as well, phony academic institutionsoften under the guise of technical, vocational, or English-language schools -provide false cover for those seeking to come to the United States illegally. Due to the lack of adequate rules and enforcement, fraud thrives in the application process and is aided during the application review process by a lack of inadequate information and biometrically based technologies.
Religious Worker Fraud in Brooklyn
Muhammad Khalil was the imam and director of the Dar Ehya Essunnah mosque, located in a Brooklyn basement. Khalil was never charged with terrorism offenses. However, investigators said that he incited others to jihad, associating himself with Al Qaeda and bin Ladin and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. He urged Muslims living in the United States to arm, and stated, "Hopefully, another attack in the United States will come shortly." 202 According to a source who lived at the mosque in July 2000, the premises were filthy and cockroach-infested with poor sanitary conditions. 203 Few people came there to pray. 204 Since 1993, Khalil had used his position as director of a mosque to sponsor more than 200 applications for aliens seeking to obtain immigrant and nonimmigrant religious worker visas through the INS's religious worker program. According to his indictment, Khalil told the federal agents at INS offices in New York "that each applicant gave a donation to the Mosque-the usual fee was $20, but some applicants gave thousands of dollars." 205 In November 2001, a witness ("W-1") in custody on immigration charges informed the agents interviewing him that "Muhammad Khalil . . . was the director of the Mosque, where W-1 had been living. W-1 stated that he paid Khalil $5,000 to $6,000 to sponsor W-1 under the INS Religious Worker program. . . . W-1 said that he saw non-religious workers pay Khalil $5,000 to $6,000 to file Religious Worker applications for them." • Shabbir Ahmed. There are a few reasons why these claims are an excellent choice for terrorists. First, the claim itself keeps the applicant from a potential automatic removal or detention. Second, if an applicant for asylum (whether at a port of entry, a hard border, or in a court room) does not appear to pose a threat to public safety, the lack of detention space usually means the applicant is free to move about the United States. Third, often the only information available to a judge is the word of the applicant without corroborating evidence, so fraudulent claims are easily made by those motivated to make them. For all of these reasons, political asylum claims usually permit terrorists to do what they seek: buy time to live here freely.
On , Nuradin Abdi was indicted in Columbus, Ohio, on four counts, including conspiracy to provide material support to al Qaeda. 213 In 1999, Abdi had applied for and received asylum. Abdi was allegedly involved in a plot with the admitted al Qaeda member Iyman Faris 214 to blow up a Columbus shopping mall. In addition, Abdi allegedly received bomb-making instructions from a co-conspirator and had intended to travel to Ethiopia to receive training in guns, guerrilla warfare, and bombs at a military-style training camp. 215 Federal investigators believe that the plot may have involved as many as five people. 216 The three other men, unnamed, were truck drivers with Faris.
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Sixteen other instances of political asylum being used to either prevent removal or deportation are as follows:
• Kamran Sheikh Akhtar was detained in Charlotte, North Carolina while videotaping buildings there in July 2004. He entered the United States illegally through Mexico in December 1991 and claimed political asylum in 1992. Five years later, in 1997, the asylum request was denied. A month later, he sought to resist removal by filing for residency based on marriage to an American. In March 1998, he is found by an immigration judge to be removable and is given voluntary departure, but a month later the marriage petition secures a permanent residency. 218 • Abdul Halim Hassan Al-Ashqar came to the United States on a student visa in 1989. He had received a scholarship through the U.S. government from the Thomas Jefferson Center "in order to complete my higher education in Business Administration" 219 at the University of Mississippi. He was able to do so despite the fact that he had co-founded a university on the West Bank with Abu Marzook (eventually deported for his role as U.S. leader of Hamas) and Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. He had run public relations at that university for eight years prior to coming to the United States. Once in the United States, Al-Ashqar overstayed his visa and continued working for Hamas in a variety of functions. 220 He was imprisoned for refusing to testify about Abu Marzook during a grand jury investigation. 221 Al-Ashqar was then placed in deportation hearings himself, but claimed political asylum. The asylum claim was denied, but he fought that denial for six years in U.S. courts. In 2004, he agreed to voluntarily depart, but was instead indicted on RICO charges for running Hamas in the United States with Marzook. 222 In January 2005 announced he was an independent candidate for president of the Palestinian Authority. 223 • Hesham Hedayet, who killed airline personnel at LAX on July 4, 2002, filed for political asylum in 1992 but ended up acquiring legal status through a diversity immigration lottery.
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• Rabih Haddad, a Lebanese citizen and a co-founder and chairman of the Global Relief Foundation (GRF), was arrested on December 14, 2001 , the same day that its offices were raided. 225 GRF's assets were frozen by the U.S. Treasury Department on December 14, 2001, for financially supporting al Qaeda. 226 Also on December 14, 2001, the government detained Haddad on a visa violation. Haddad was originally admitted to the United States in 1998 with the status of a non-immigrant visitor. His visa expired on August 31, 1999. 227 Haddad was ordered deported. Despite a series of appeals and the filing of an application for asylum and withholding of removal, 228 in November 2002 an Immigration Judge concluded that he presented "a substantial risk to the national security of the United States." 229 Haddad appealed again and was denied again, and on July 14, 2003, Haddad was deported to Lebanon. 230 After his deportation, the Department of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued a press release that reiterated GRF's ties to Wadi El-Hage and stated again that GRF was a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
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• At least three people closely associated with the September 11 hijackers claimed political asylum, one that helped them obtain Virginia identification cards, and two other "friends."
• Malek Mohamed Seif, a friend of 9/11 hijacker Hanjour filed a false application for asylum and was indicted for social security, mail, and immigration fraud. 
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• Abdel Hakim Tizegha, an associate of the LAX Millennium plotters, claimed political asylum based on persecution by Muslim fundamentalists. He said he entered at Boston as a stowaway on an Algerian gas tanker. Hearings were rescheduled five times. The claim was denied two years later, and then appealed. Nine months later his location was unknown.
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• Abu Mezer, responsible for the New York City subway plot in August 1997, was arrested in Washington state in January 1997 after his third attempt to illegally enter the United States. The next month, he applied for political asylum, denying an affiliation with Hamas. In July, he did not show up for his hearing. Instead, he called his attorney and stated he had married a U.S. citizen and was living in Canada. On Aug. 1, 1997, he was arrested in New York City based on an informant's tip. 236 • Muin Mohammad (aka Muin Shabib, Kamel Mohammad Shabib, and Abu Muhammad) is one of the original founders of AAEF and is listed on the group's 1993 IRS Form 990 as the secretary of the AAEF Executive Committee. 237 According to an FBI Action Memorandum, Muin Kamel Mohammed Shabib attended the October 1993 Hamas conference in Philadelphia along with Abdelhaleem Al-Ashqar and others. 238 And documents submitted by the Department of Justice in HLFRD v. John Ashcroft show that Shabib was identified by the government of Israel as a senior Hamas operative formerly in charge of Hamas' Central Section (Ramallah-Jerusalem) in the West Bank. 239 On March 16, 1994, the FBI in Falls Church, Va., at the home of Yasser Bushnaq, interviewed Shabib. During the interview, Shabib admitted supporting Hamas financially and politically. 240 Shabib was interviewed under the pretext of gaining information relating to his immigration status (he had applied for political asylum in December 1993).
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• Faraj Hassan was arrested and charged with naturalization fraud in June 2004 after being granted refugee status from Syria in 1993. He worked for the Benevolence International Foundation that was considered a strong source of funding for Al Qaeda. 242 • Three terrorists involved in the Feb. 26, 1993, World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yousef, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, and Biblal Alkaisi, all sought political asylum. Yousef, mastermind of the bombing, was initially arrested with fraudulent travel documents upon entry at JFK International Airport in August 1992. Yousef claimed political asylum and was released pending a hearing. 243 Alkaisi, also a key witness in the Meir Kahane murder, filed for both "temporary protected status" using a fake birth certificate and fake immigration entry record in August 1991, and for political asylum in May 1992 falsely claiming a prior illegal entry. 244 Sheik Rahman, who issued the fatwa for Anwar Sadat's assassination and was also convicted for his role as the spiritual leader of the 1995 conspiracy to bomb New York City landmarks, had a long history of immigration violations and fraud, including a March 1992 political asylum claim to prevent his pending deportation. 245 • Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed two people outside CIA headquarters on Jan. 25, 1993 , became an illegal overstay in February 1991. In February 1992, he simultaneously sought both political asylum and amnesty under a 1986 law. While the applications were pending, he was able to obtain a Virginia driver license and work as a courier. 246 • Ibrahim Parlak of the Kurdistan Worker's Party applied for political asylum upon his arrival to the United States in 1991. In 1992, he was granted asylum and LPR status the following year. In October 2004, he was charged with inciting terrorism and providing material support for terrorist activities. He was also charged with lying on his INS applications for failing to disclose his membershipin the Kurdistan Worker's Party along with his prior aggravated felon record from Turkey.
Conclusion
The attack of 9/11 was not an isolated instance of al Qaeda infiltration into the United States. In fact, dozens of operatives, mostly before, but also a few after 9/11(other than the 9/11 hijackers) have managed to enter and embed themselves in the United States, actively carrying out plans to commit terrorist acts against U.S. interests or support designated foreign terrorist organizations. For each to do so, they needed the guise of legal immigration status to support them. Al Qaeda has used every viable means of entry. The longer the duration of the permissible length of stay granted by the visa or the adjustment of status to permanent residency or naturalization, the easier the terrorist could travel both within and without the United States. No matter what the terrorist organization or mission, it is clear from this study that terrorists will continue to try to come to the United States to carry out operations, and their instructions will continue to include immigration-related plans. Until we have a system designed to weed out terrorists, their plans on how to stay in the United States will likely succeed.
Those who come to stay and embed themselves into communities throughout the United States will continue to rely on a false guise of legality. Sham marriages and student status that lead to legal permanent residency and an almost certain guarantee of naturalization will likely continue to be some of the most egregious immigration abuses by terrorists. More aggressive culling of applications for national security risks will help prevent terrorists from attaining enhanced immigration status on the front end. However, it must therefore be a prerequisite for any strategy that seeks to attain border security to include the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) in fraud prevention and national security agendas.
Risk management as well as targeting and pattern analysis will help assure that tight resources are used more efficiently to target immigration benefit applications that may pose a national security risk. In addition, law enforcement agencies with criminal jurisdiction, such as the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and FBI-run Joint Terrorism Task Forces, must consider such investigations as priorities. Once it is discovered that a naturalized citizen is a terrorist, denaturalization should be automatically put in motion with a streamlined appeals process that harnesses the talents of both ICE and DOJ legal expertise.
To address fraud effectively, immigration benefits adjudicators must have access to comprehensive, biometrically based immigration histories that include information from the moment an individual first applies for a visa at a U.S. consulate or presents a passport at a port of entry through every subsequent request for an immigration benefit. USCIS needs to have a fully electronic applications process with biometrics embedded into each application and required on site interviews. Adequate human resources will be necessary to fulfill such a mandate while efficiently processing applications. Well-trained fraud specialists should be available at every immigration benefits center with access to the Forensic Document Lab. The practical result is that USCIS should not have to rely solely on fees for upgrading its data systems, technologies, security vetting procedures and other necessary national security tasks. Budgets must be allocated.
Also critical are security background checks, with real-time access to federal, state, and local law enforcement information upon request. The more access that is given to the national security or law enforcement information that exists on a foreign national, the less we will need to rely upon unwieldy name-based watchlists. The more security measures the United States incorporates into its own adjudications of immigration benefits before they are granted, the more success the United States will have in rebuffing terrorists who seek to embed here.
Underpinning practical improvements at USCIS must be a commitment to enforce the law with better and more resources. Better resources include clearer guidelines for processing immigration benefits in order to eliminate the arbitrary decision-making that inevitably takes place in their absence. In addition, comprehensive immigration reform must entail, in the long run, not only streamlining the overly complex immigration laws, but also providing sufficient human and technological resources to enforce the law on the border and in USCIS immigration benefits centers.
These recommendations should not be considered in a policy vacuum. Comprehensive immigration reform that includes review of all elements of our immigration security infrastructure (seven fragments dispersed through six agencies) must be vigorously debated and addressed now. However, that does not mean that we should wait to provide sorely needed technological, informational, and human resources to our frontline personnel at U.S. consulates abroad, at our ports of entry, and our borders. Severe deficiencies have existed in these areas for years that must be redressed now; what we still lack are the metrics to determine exactly what measures will provide the best value on tight border budgets. We must find a way to acquire that information to assure our border system provides the value the American people deserve and have the right to demand. Endnotes 1 I covered the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) while my closest colleague, Tom Eldridge, primarily covered consular affairs at the State Department. Another colleague, Walt Hempel, did essential work on reviewing alien files of terrorists and helping me vet complex immigration law questions. My other colleague, Kelly Moore, while joining us late in the game, did essential work helping us edit and fill in intelligence portions of the report. We could not have done any of this work without the support of the 9/11 Commissioners and Executive Director Philip Zelikow, Deputy Director Chris Kojm, General Counsel Dan Marcus, and the ingenuity of Susan Ginsburg. Each gave us necessary go-aheads at various critical junctures during our investigation and production of the report. 2 9/11 and Terrorist Travel is available in book form from Hillsboro Press.
